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Beef Products, Inc. v. ABC News: (Pink) Slimy 
Enough to Determine the Constitutionality 
of Agricultural Disparagement Laws? 
NICOLE C. SASAKI* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1991 and 1997, thirteen states in the United States1 
enacted agricultural disparagement laws,2 with the purpose of 
creating a new cause of action to protect agribusiness from 
criticism in ways that purposefully eliminated constitutional 
obstacles to recovery.3  The threat of suit from this new cause of 
action presents serious implications for otherwise protected free 
speech pertaining to safety concerns and criticisms of our food 
system.  Although these laws have been in place for over fifteen 
years, they have rarely been used in litigation, and the two cases 
 
* J.D. Magna Cum Laude, Certificate in Environmental Law, Pace 
University School of Law, 2014; B.A. High Honors, 2008, University of 
California, Berkeley.  I would like to thank Linda C. Fentiman for her guidance 
in crafting this Comment.  I would also like to thank the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW REVIEW editors and associates for their tireless work and dedication to this 
Comment. 
 1. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. 
 2. ALA. CODE § 6-5-621 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113 (2012); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-31-101 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065 (West 2012); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2002 (West 2012); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502 (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-251 (West 2012); N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-02 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81 (West 
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 5 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-2 
(2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002 (West 2011). 
 3. Steven G. Brody & Bruce E.H. Johnson, Advertising & Commercial 
Speech: A First Amendment Guide, in AGRICULTURAL DISPARAGEMENT STATUTES 
§ 8:4 (PLI, 2012). 
1
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that have resulted in published court opinions4 were dismissed 
without the courts reaching a decision on the merits,5 so none of 
these statutes has yet come under constitutional judicial review.6  
However, as this Comment will explore, a case recently filed in 
2012 may have the merits to finally warrant such a review of 
whether these statutes will survive constitutional scrutiny under 
the First Amendment. 
On September 13, 2012, Beef Products, Inc. (BPI) filed suit 
against the American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., ABC News 
and several individual news anchors (ABC News), and sources 
interviewed by ABC News to recover damages for “defamation, 
product and food disparagement, tortious interference with 
business relationships, and other wrongs.”7  The case revolved 
around ABC News’ March and April 2012 news coverage of BPI’s 
product—lean finely textured beef (LFTB)—in which BPI claimed 
that ABC News “knowingly misled the public into believing that 
LFTB was not beef at all, but rather was an unhealthy ‘pink 
slime’ ‘hidden’ in ground beef as part of an ‘economic fraud’ 
masterminded by BPI.”8  However, ABC News has moved to 
dismiss the case on the grounds that the lawsuit “directly 
challenges the right of a national news organization . . . to explore 
matters of obvious public interest—what is in the food we eat and 
 
 4. See generally Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 
1998), aff’d, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000); Action for a Clean Env’t v. Georgia, 
457 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
 5. Winfrey, 201 F.3d at 690 (observing “[t]he cattlemen’s complaints 
regarding the ‘Dangerous Food’ broadcast of ‘The Oprah Winfrey Show’ 
presented one of the first opportunities to interpret a food disparagement 
statute,” and finding “insufficiency of the cattlemen’s evidence . . . renders 
unnecessary a complete inquiry into the Act’s scope.”); Action for a Clean Env’t, 
457 S.E.2d at 274 (finding that “[i]n this case there is no party to this action who 
seeks to uphold the constitutionality of the statute under attack,” and holding 
that “[b]ecause there is no adverse party to the proceeding, the trial court 
correctly dismissed appellants’ declaratory judgment action for failure to state a 
claim.”); see Rita Marie Cain, Food, Inglorious Food: Food Safety, Food Libel, 
and Free Speech, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 275, 308 (2012) (citing Eileen Gay Jones, 
Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and Food Safety in the Era of 
Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 823, 842 (2001)). 
 6. See Margot S. Fell, Agricultural Disparagement Statutes: Tainted Beef, 
Tainted Speech, and Tainted Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
981, 982-83 (1999). 
 7. Complaint ¶ 1, Beef Prods., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 2012 WL 4017340 (S.D. Cir. 
Sept. 13, 2012) (No. 12-292) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 8. Id. ¶ 6. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/4
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how that food is labeled.”9  This case is the first to rely on South 
Dakota’s agricultural disparagement law.10  If the facts of the 
case were to support a judgment on the merits, then the courts 
would finally be forced to address the constitutionality of 
agricultural disparagement laws. 
This Comment analyzes the likelihood of whether BPI’s case 
against ABC News will be decided on the merits, whether South 
Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute will be upheld as 
constitutional, and thus the likelihood that other states’ statutes 
will be struck down, thereby preserving the public’s freedom to 
question and criticize the safety of our food system.  First, Part I 
offers a brief introduction to agricultural disparagement laws, 
their historical application, and BPI’s pending lawsuit.  Next, 
Part II reviews the context of the enactment of agricultural 
disparagement laws, summarizes the common elements of these 
laws, and discusses Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey.  Parts III (A) 
and (B) discuss BPI v. ABC News and analyze whether the facts 
of the case are sufficient to permit a decision on the merits.  Part 
III (C) analyzes the constitutionality of South Dakota’s 
agricultural disparagement statute under the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  Finally, Part IV concludes that 
BPI’s case will probably fail on the merits, and that South 
Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute is likely 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
 
 9. Memorandum in Support of ABC Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss All 
Claims of Plaintiff Beef Products, Inc. at 4, Beef Prods., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No. 
12-4183 (D.S.D. Oct. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].  After ABC News 
had the case removed to federal court, the United States District Court for the 
District of South Dakota remanded the case to the Circuit Court of South 
Dakota on June 12, 2013.  Beef Prod., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No. CIV 12292, 2014 WL 
1245307, at *1 (S.D. Cir. Mar. 27, 2014).  On March 27, 2014, the Circuit Court 
of South Dakota granted in part and denied in part ABC News’ motion to 
dismiss, finding that S.D. Codified Laws § 20-10A preempts common law 
disparagement causes of action.  Id. at *4.  Thus BPI’s claim under South 
Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute will go forward. 
 10. Jones, supra note 5, at 842 (noting “[o]f the five cases, three originated in 
Texas, one in Georgia, and one in Ohio”). 
3
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II. BACKGROUND 
A.  Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes 
In 1990, Washington State apple growers brought a class 
action lawsuit against CBS “60 Minutes.”11  The lawsuit sought to 
recover for the alleged damages suffered by the apple industry 
after the broadcast of the “60 Minutes” segment entitled “‘A’ is for 
Apple,” which highlighted the use of Alar, a carcinogenic pesticide 
that was commonly sprayed on apples at the time.12  Most 
scholars have recognized the dismissal of this case as having led 
to the enactment of agricultural disparagement laws by state 
legislatures.13 
The “60 Minutes” segment centered on a report by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, entitled Intolerable Risk: 
Pesticides in Our Children’s Food, which summarized health 
risks to children associated with the use of pesticides on fruit.14  
The report concerned the spraying on apples of the chemical 
growth regulator, Alar, a known carcinogen.15  The segment 
noted that Alar could not be removed by washing or peeling the 
fruit, and that it stayed in the fruit’s flesh and could thus be 
found in processed apple products, including apple sauce and 
apple juice.16  The plaintiffs alleged that in response to the 
broadcast, there was a dramatic decrease in consumer demand 
for apples and apple products, and that those dependent on the 
apple economy lost millions of dollars.17 
A class action suit was filed by Washington State apple 
growers in November 1990, and included a common law claim for 
 
 11. See generally Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 836 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wash. 
1993), aff’d, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Fell, supra note 6, at 986; accord Cain, supra note 5, at 278; accord Jones, 
supra note 5, at 825; accord Ronald K.L. Collins, Free Speech, Food Libel, & the 
First Amendment . . . in Ohio, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000); accord Sara 
Lunsford Kohen, What Ever Happened to Veggie Libel?: Why Plaintiffs are Not 
Using Agricultural Product Disparagement Statutes, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 261, 
267 (2011). 
 14. Auvil, 67 F.3d at 818. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 818 n.2. 
 17. Id. at 819. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/4
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product disparagement.18  To prove a claim of product 
disparagement, also known as trade libel, a plaintiff must: (1) 
“allege that the defendant published a knowingly false statement 
harmful to the interests of another,” and (2) “intended such 
publication to harm the plaintiff’s pecuniary interests.”19  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Washington granted summary judgment to CBS because the 
plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a triable 
issue of fact regarding the falsity of the broadcast.20 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found that in order for a claim for product disparagement 
to be actionable, the plaintiff must prove the falsity of the 
disparaging statements.21  With little guidance from existing case 
law on product disparagement, the court of appeals referred to 
defamation cases in deciding the falsity prong.22 
The plaintiffs made three arguments, each of which the court 
rejected in turn.  First, the plaintiffs challenged the use of animal 
studies to substantiate the report’s conclusion that ingesting Alar 
causes cancer in humans.23  The court rejected this argument, 
finding that animal studies were a proper means of gauging 
cancer risks to humans.24  Second, the plaintiffs argued that 
there had been no scientific study on cancer risks to children from 
pesticide use.25  The court again rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, 
and found that the report asserted that traces of Alar on apples 
were more harmful to children than to adults because children 
ingest more apple products per unit of body weight than do 
adults.26  Third, the plaintiffs argued that by viewing the entire 
broadcast segment, the jury could find that it contained a 
provably false message, because the burden of proving falsity 
could be satisfied by proof of the falsity of the implied message.27  
 
 18. Auvil, 67 F.3d at 819. 
 19. Id. at 820 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977)). 
 20. Id. at 819. 
 21. Id. at 820 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977)). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 821. 
 24. Auvil, 67 F.3d at 821 (citations omitted). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Auvil, 67 F.3d at 822. 
5
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The court declined to adopt the plaintiffs’ rationale, finding that 
falsity does not proceed from an implied, disparaging message.28  
In addition, the court found support in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts that the standard for proving a statement’s falsity in 
product disparagement must “[refer] to individual statements and 
not to any overall message.”29  Thus, the court of appeals affirmed 
the lower court’s decision.30  This negative precedent ultimately 
set the stage for the national response by state legislatures to 
create agricultural disparagement laws.31 
B. State Legislators’ Response 
Auvil’s negative outcome for the apple growers prompted the 
agricultural industry to lobby state legislators “for protection 
from disparagement that would be easier to prove than 
traditional common law trade libel.”32  The meat industry, 
farming associations, and manufacturers of chemicals and 
pesticides lobbied with exceptional strength for the passage of 
agricultural disparagement laws.33  Although most states have 
considered agricultural product disparagement legislation,34 only 
thirteen have actually enacted such legislation.35 
These agricultural disparagement statutes were largely 
similar, but some of the statutes did contain notable differences 
from the rest.  To begin, most of the agricultural disparagement 
laws imposed civil liability, but Colorado’s statute criminalized 
“knowingly [making] any materially false statement,” for the 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 651(1)(c) (1977)). 
 30. Id. at 823. 
 31. Perhaps ironically, even though the decision in Auvil led to the enactment 
of agricultural disparagement statutes across the United States, Washington 
State is without an agricultural disparagement statute. See generally id. at 820. 
 32. Cain, supra note 5, at 279. 
 33. Jones, supra note 5, at 832-33. 
 34. Id. at 833. 
 35. ALA. CODE § 6-5-621; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 35-31-101; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065; GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2; IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 6-2002; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502; MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-251; N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-02; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81; OKLA. STAT. ANN. 




2014] BEEF PRODUCTS, INC. v. ABC NEWS 777 
purposes of price control, market quantity control, or restraining 
trade of food for humans or for domestic animals.36 
The twelve remaining state statutes protected variations of 
perishable agricultural or aquacultural food products.37  North 
Dakota’s statute was broader, as it explicitly included the 
additional protection of agricultural producers and a “group or 
class and any association representing an agricultural 
producer.”38 
With a few variations, the majority of agricultural 
disparagement statutes lacked standards of proof, and instead 
required that evidence proving falsity be based on “reasonable 
and reliable scientific” inquiries, facts, or data.39  However, 
Idaho’s statute adhered to a “clear and convincing evidence” 
 
 36. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-31-101; see Cain, supra note 5, at 276.  As 
such, the Colorado statute will not be included in the rest of this analysis, which 
will focus on civil liability. 
 37. Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, South 
Dakota and Texas statutes all explicitly include the protection of aquacultural 
food products.  ALA. CODE § 6-5-621(2) (protecting “agricultural or aquacultural” 
“perishable food product or commodity”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(E)(2) 
(protecting perishable “agricultural or aquacultural food product or commodity 
grown or produced in this state”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065(2)(b) (protecting 
perishable “agricultural or aquacultural food product or commodity grown or 
produced within the State of Florida”); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(2) (protecting 
perishable “agricultural or aquacultural food product”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-
2002(2) (protecting “[p]erishable agricultural food product . . . intended for 
human consumption”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(2) (protecting “[p]erishable 
agricultural or aquacultural food product”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-253(b) 
(protecting “perishable agricultural or aquacultural food product”); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 32-44-02 (protecting “agricultural producer or an agricultural 
product”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(B)(3) (protecting perishable 
agricultural or aquacultural food product or commodity that is “grown, raised, 
produced, distributed, or sold within this state”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 5-
101(1-2) (protecting “perishable agricultural food product . . . intended for 
human consumption”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-1(1) (protecting perishable 
food product of agriculture or aquaculture); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
96.001 (protecting perishable “food product of agriculture or aquaculture”). 
 38. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-03 (additionally protecting “entire group or 
class of agricultural producers or products”). 
 39. ALA. CODE § 6-5-621(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(E)(1); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 865.065(2)(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-253(a); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-01; OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2307.81(B)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 5-102(A); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 96.003. 
7
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standard,40 and South Dakota’s statute failed to state any 
standard for proof of falsity.41 
In defining the term “disparagement,” most of the states’ 
statutes used language such as “not safe for human 
consumption.”42  South Dakota’s statute used an expanded 
definition of “disparagement,” which included “generally accepted 
agricultural and management practices [that] make agricultural 
food products unsafe for consumption by the public.”43  North 
Dakota’s statute used a narrower definition, which only required 
that the agricultural producer be “damaged.”44 
Most of the states45 differed between two primary variations 
of the required mental state: (1) “willful or malicious,”46 and (2) 
knowledge of falsity.47  North Dakota’s statute required a mens 
rea of “willfully or purposefully.”48  Instead of affirmatively 
stating a required intent, the Alabama statute stated that “[i]t is 
no defense under this article that the actor did not intend, or was 
unaware of, the act charged.”49 
All twelve of the state statutes gave standing to the producer 
of the disparaged agricultural product to bring suit.50  In 
 
 40. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2003(2). 
 41. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-1. 
 42. ALA. CODE § 6-5-621(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(B); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 865.065(2)(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(1); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2002(1)(b); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-253(a); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2307.81(B)(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 5-101(1); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 96.002(a)(3). 
 43. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-1(2). 
 44. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-02. 
 45. Arizona, Florida, Georgia and Idaho require an intent of “willful or 
malicious.”  Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas 
require a mental state of “knowledge of falsity.” 
 46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(A); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065(2)(a); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(1); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2002(1)(d). 
 47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-253(a); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2307.81(C); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 5-102(A); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 20-10A-1(2); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002(a)(2). 
 48. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-02. 
 49. ALA. CODE § 6-5-623. 
 50. ALA. CODE § 6-5-622; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(A); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
865.065(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(3); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2003(1); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 3:4503; MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-255; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-
03; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(C); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 5-102(A); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-2; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002(b). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/4
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addition, anyone who “markets or sells” had standing in 
Alabama,51 and “shippers, or an association that represents 
producers or shippers” had standing in Arizona.52  “Any 
association representing producers” had standing in Florida,53 
“the entire chain from grower to consumer” had standing in 
Georgia,54 and any “association representing an agricultural 
producer” had standing in North Dakota.55  Ohio gave standing to 
producers and explicitly defined the term to include “a person 
who grows, raises, produces, distributes, or sells.”56 
C.  Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey 
In 1996, Texas cattle ranchers Texas Beef Group, Perryton 
Feeders, Inc., Maltese Cross Cattle Company, Bravo Cattle 
Company, Alpha 3 Cattle Company, Paul F. Engler, Cactus 
Feeders, Inc., Cactus Growers, Inc., and Dripping Springs Cattle 
Company57 filed the most famous agricultural disparagement 
case to date when they sued Oprah Winfrey after she broadcast a 
television segment on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, 
commonly known as Mad Cow Disease.58 
The “Dangerous Food” episode of “The Oprah Winfrey Show” 
included a segment discussing the discovery of Mad Cow Disease 
in Britain, its symptoms, its threat to the United States, and the 
steps being taken to prevent an outbreak of Mad Cow Disease in 
the United States.59  Howard Lyman, a former cattle rancher-
turned-vegetarian60 and guest on the show, allegedly exaggerated 
the threat of Mad Cow Disease in the United States.61  The 
plaintiffs alleged that after the show was broadcast on April 16, 
1996, there was a drastic drop in the fed cattle market in the 
 
 51. ALA. CODE § 6-5-622. 
 52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(A). 
 53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065(3). 
 54. See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(3). 
 55. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-03. 
 56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(B)(4). 
 57. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858, 860 (N.D. Tex. 1998), aff’d, 
201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 58. Winfrey, 201 F.3d at 682. 
 59. Id. at 683. 
 60. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 861. 
 61. See id. 
9
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Texas Panhandle, with declines in price and volume of sales that 
lasted for eleven weeks.62 
On May 28, 1996 the Texas cattlemen sued Winfrey and 
Lyman alleging several causes of action, including false 
disparagement of perishable food products.63  The plaintiffs 
claimed that the “Dangerous Food” episode was presented as a 
“scary story” which falsely suggested, “U.S. beef [was] highly 
dangerous because of Mad Cow Disease and that a horrible 
epidemic worse than Aids [sic] could occur from eating U.S. beef.”  
Additionally, the show allegedly caused an immediate crash in 
beef markets, thereby damaging the plaintiffs.64 
In partially granting the defendants’ motion for judgment as 
a matter of law,65 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas began its analysis of the plaintiffs’ 
agricultural disparagement claim with the language of Texas’ 
False Disparagement of Perishable Food Products Act.66  Texas’ 
agricultural disparagement statute provided that the term 
“perishable food product” meant “a food product of agriculture . . . 
that [was] sold or distributed in a form that [would] perish or 
decay beyond marketability within a limited period of time.”67  In 
addition, in order to impose liability for agricultural 
disparagement, the statute required that “the person [know] the 
information [was] false.”68 
The court’s opinion acknowledged the role of the First 
Amendment in governing the plaintiffs’ cause of action and 
determining constitutional muster.69  But the court ultimately 
determined that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the statutory 
elements, and consequently stopped its analysis without 
addressing the statute’s constitutionality.  First, the court 
determined that the plaintiffs’ product was sold “in the form of 
live cattle,” and that live cattle were not “a food product that 
 
 62. Winfrey, 201 F.3d at 684. 
 63. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
96.002). 
 64. Id. at 862. 
 65. Id. at 860. 
 66. Id. at 862 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002). 
 67. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.001). 
 68. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002). 
 69. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 862. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/4
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[would] perish or decay beyond marketability within a limited 
period of time” as required by the statute, and thus fell outside 
the protection of the Act.70  Second, the court found that the 
plaintiffs failed to meet the statutory requirement that “the 
disparaging statement be knowingly made.”71  The court 
determined that the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence by which 
a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendants had actual 
knowledge of the falsity of the statements made.72  Thus, because 
the plaintiffs failed to meet two of the statutory requirements for 
Texas’ agricultural disparagement law, the court dismissed the 
case. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit only 
reviewed one of the two findings made by the lower court in 
regard to the plaintiffs’ agricultural disparagement claim—
whether the defendants knowingly disseminated false 
information about beef.73  The court of appeals was more critical 
of the defendants than the lower court had been, accusing them of 
having “melodramatized” the Mad Cow Disease scare, specifically 
citing Winfrey’s exclamation that she was “stopped cold from 
eating another burger.”74  Nevertheless, the court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s opinion that the plaintiffs had failed to 
sustain their burden of proving a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning liability under the Act.75 
The Fifth Circuit expressly recognized that the suit 
presented one of the first opportunities for judicial review of a 
food disparagement statute.76  Nevertheless, the court refrained 
from undertaking a constitutional analysis, because the lack of 
evidence made it unnecessary to inquire into the Act’s full 
scope.77  Accordingly, no agricultural disparagement statute has 
made it past the merits to undergo judicial review for 
constitutionality. 
 
 70. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 863. 
 71. Id. at 862. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 687 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 74. Id. at 688. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 690. 
 77. See Winfrey, 201 F.3d at 690.,. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
A. South Dakota’s Agricultural Disparagement Law 
South Dakota’s agricultural disparagement law is separated 
into four sections: (1) definition of terms,78 (2) cause of action for 
damages,79 (3) liability for treble damages,80 and (4) statute of 
limitations of one year on actions for damages.81 
Section 20-10A-2 creates a cause of action for damages: “Any 
producer of perishable agricultural food products who suffers 
damage as a result of another person’s disparagement of any such 
perishable agricultural food product has a cause of action for 
damages and any other appropriate relief in a court of competent 
jurisdiction.”82  At first glance, and based on the damages 
plaintiff suffered, it would appear that BPI has a cause of action 
against ABC News.  However, an in-depth analysis reveals that 
the facts of the case fail to satisfy several of the elements required 
for liability. 
 
 78. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-1 (“Definition of terms. Terms used in this 
chapter mean: (1) ‘Agricultural food product,’ any food product of agriculture or 
aquaculture that is sold or distributed in a form that will perish or decay beyond 
marketability within a period of time; and (2) ‘Disparagement,’ dissemination in 
any manner to the public of any information that the disseminator knows to be 
false and that states or implies that an agricultural food product is not safe for 
consumption by the public or that generally accepted agricultural and 
management practices make agricultural food products unsafe for consumption 
by the public; (3) ‘Generally accepted agricultural and management practices,’ 
agronomic and animal husbandry procedures used in the production of 
agricultural goods including tillage options, fertilizers, crop protection practices 
for crop production, and the feeding, transporting, housing, and health practices 
for livestock”). 
 79. Id. § 20-10A-2 (stating “[a]ny producer of perishable agricultural food 
products who suffers damage as a result of another person's disparagement of 
any such perishable agricultural food product has a cause of action for damages 
and any other appropriate relief in a court of competent jurisdiction”). 
 80. See id. § 20-10A-3 (stating “[a]ny person who disparages a perishable 
agricultural food product with intent to harm the producer is liable to the 
producer for treble the damages so caused”). 
 81. See id. § 20-10A-4 (stating “[a]ny civil action for damages for 
disparagement of perishable agricultural food products shall be commenced 
within one year after the cause of action accrues”). 
 82. Id. § 20-10A-2. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/4
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1. Agricultural Food Product 
Section 20-10A-1(1) of South Dakota’s agricultural 
disparagement statute defined “agricultural food product” as “any 
food product of agriculture or aquaculture that [was] sold or 
distributed in a form that [would] perish or decay beyond 
marketability within a period of time.”83 
2. Disparagement 
Even if the court determined that LFTB was a perishable 
food product, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs were 
unable to satisfy the element of disparagement.  Section 20-10A-
1(2) of the statute defined “disparagement” as: 
[D]issemination in any manner to the public of any information 
that the disseminator knows to be false and that states or implies 
that an agricultural food product is not safe for consumption by 
the public or that generally accepted agricultural and 
management practices make agricultural food products unsafe for 
consumption by the public.84 
Accordingly, this element could be split into two subparts: (1) 
the defendant knew of the falsity of a statement and (2) the 
defendant stated or implied that an agricultural food product was 
unsafe for public consumption.85 
B.  Case Background 
On September 13, 2012, plaintiffs BPI, BPI Technology, Inc., 
and Freezing Machines, Inc., filed suit in the First Judicial 
Circuit Court of South Dakota against defendants American 
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., ABC News, Inc., and additional 
individual defendants.86  The plaintiffs alleged claims of product 
and food disparagement, defamation, and tortious interference 
with business relationships.87  This Comment will only focus on 
 
 83. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-1(1). 
 84. Id. § 20-10A-1(2) (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 25-27, 30-37. 
 87. Id. ¶ 1. 
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plaintiffs’ twenty-sixth count: BPI’s claim under South Dakota’s 
agricultural disparagement statute.88 
ABC News responded to plaintiffs’ complaint on October 31, 
2012 by moving to dismiss all of the plaintiffs’ claims, asserting 
that none were viable.89  The defendants further asserted that 
the case “[posed] a direct challenge to the right of ABC News to 
inform the public on a matter of obvious and legitimate public 
interest” as embodied in the First Amendment.90 
LFTB is a beef product that was first developed by BPI in the 
1970s using a mechanical process to remove fat from beef 
trimmings, allowing for the production of additional lean beef 
that had previously gone to waste.91  BPI first processes beef 
trimmings through a de-sinewer to separate out cartilage and 
connective tissue, and then heats the remaining muscle tissue 
and fat.92  The trimmings are next processed through centrifuges 
that remove virtually all of the fat from the beef trimmings, 
leaving 94% to 97% lean beef.93  The lean meat is then exposed to 
ammonia gas to remove pathogens.94  Finally, the lean beef is 
flash-frozen as an additional safety precaution to prevent 
pathogen growth while the product is in a frozen state.95  The 
entire process is completed in under thirty minutes—less time 
than it takes for bacteria to grow—a final safety precaution.96  In 
1993, the USDA decided that BPI could label its product “lean 
finely textured beef” and authorized LFTB as a source of lean 
meat for ground beef, requiring no independent labeling.97 
Plaintiff BPI produces, distributes, and sells LFTB,98 and 
secures approval for LFTB from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA).99  The other plaintiffs, BPI Technology, Inc. 
and Freezing Machines, Inc., are involved in the development of 
 
 88. See id. ¶ 22. 
 89. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 1. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 53. 
 92. See id. ¶¶ 55-56. 
 93. See id. ¶ 57. 
 94. See id. ¶ 58. 
 95. See id. ¶ 59. 
 96. See id. ¶ 60. 
 97. See Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 74. 
 98. See Complaint, supra note 7,,¶ 25. 
 99. See id. 
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technology and processing mechanisms used to produce LFTB.100  
Collectively, the plaintiffs are suing defendant ABC News, which 
broadcast “World News” with host Diane Sawyer.101 
Plaintiffs had self-described BPI as “an American success 
story” prior to March 2012.102  Plaintiffs contended that after 
ABC News’ coverage of LFTB, BPI’s sales of LFTB decreased 
from five million to less than two million pounds per week, 
resulting in the closure of three of its four production facilities 
and the lay-off of over 700 employees.103  In contrast, ABC News 
asserted that BPI’s lawsuit was merely an attempt to recover for 
“the loss in the public’s appetite for LFTB.”104 
C.  BPI’s and ABC News’ Legal Arguments 
Plaintiffs’ claim of food disparagement against ABC News 
was founded on the allegation that the defendants “knowingly 
and intentionally published nearly 200 false and disparaging 
statements” about LFTB and BPI.105  BPI’s primary assertion 
concerns ABC News’ “month-long vicious, concerted 
disinformation campaign against BPI,”106 a campaign that ABC 
News characterized as merely a follow up on consumer questions 
in response to its first report on LFTB, broadcast on March 7, 
2012.107  The defendants asserted that the purpose of ABC News’ 
coverage of LFTB was to investigate “matters of obvious public 
interest—what is in the food we eat and how that food is 
labeled.”108 
BPI additionally alleged that the “disinformation campaign” 
resulted in the creation of a “consumer backlash” against LFTB 
and BPI.109  Plaintiffs claimed that the backlash’s strength was 
attributable to ABC News because during its lengthy coverage of 
LFTB, it represented to its audience that it was reporting “facts” 
 
 100. See id. ¶¶ 26, 27. 
 101. See id. ¶¶ 30-32. 
 102. Id. ¶ 88. 
 103. Id. ¶ 19. 
 104. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 1. 
 105. Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 1. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
 108. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 4. 
 109. Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 112. 
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about LFTB and BPI and repeatedly used the phrase “pink slime” 
to describe LFTB.110  Plaintiffs alleged that the phrase “pink 
slime” was used to refer to LFTB in order to convince consumers 
that it was “not beef, or even meat,”111 and was unsafe for 
consumption.112  Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that ABC News’ 
use of the term “pink slime” was to convince viewers that BPI had 
engaged in “improper conduct to gain approval for LFTB from the 
USDA.”113  Plaintiffs contended that, as a result of ABC News’ 
coverage of LFTB, consumers “demanded that grocery stores stop 
selling ground beef made with ‘pink slime.’”114 
Plaintiffs contended that ABC News knew, as required for 
statutory liability, that it was broadcasting false statements 
regarding LFTB because it failed to use information provided by 
BPI and others in opposition to the “disinformation campaign.”115  
In addition, BPI claimed that the defendants’ statements were 
contrary to decisions from the USDA and the Food and Drug 
Administration,116 and that ABC News failed to obtain 
information directly from the USDA until after the majority of its 
coverage of LFTB.117  BPI also alleged that ABC News avoided 
broadcasting statements from beef and food safety experts 
because the facts about LFTB and BPI that they offered were 
inconsistent with the message of ABC News’ “disinformation 
campaign.”118  However, according to ABC News, its early 
coverage of LFTB included commentary from the meat industry, 
which asserted that LFTB labeling was unnecessary.119  In 
addition, after being contacted by BPI’s lawyers, ABC News 
broadcast BPI’s defenses that LFTB was nutritious and USDA 
approved, and also took further actions to include BPI’s 
perspective in additional segments.120 
 
 110. Id. ¶¶ 112, 130. 
 111. Id. ¶ 131. 
 112. Id. ¶¶ 132-33. 
 113. Id. ¶ 134. 
 114. Id. ¶135. 
 115. See Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 141. 
 116. Id. ¶ 151. 
 117. See id. ¶ 153. 
 118. Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 154. 
 119. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 5. 
 120. Id. at 6-7. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/4
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Plaintiffs asserted that defendants’ disparaging statements 
inferred that LFTB was unsafe for consumption, which was in 
direct opposition to LFTB’s safety record.  Plaintiffs noted that 
despite the fact that BPI sold over 5.4 billion pounds of LFTB 
since 1993, no reported health incident had been associated with 
LFTB.121  In addition, BPI had been awarded by the beef industry 
and food safety organizations for its commitment to producing 
safe beef.122  Yet, contrary to BPI’s perceived negative inferences 
regarding LFTB, ABC News stated that it in fact repeatedly 
asserted the safety of LFTB for public consumption throughout 
its news coverage of LFTB.123  Thus, ABC News urged that it was 
inconceivable its direct statements attesting to the safety of 
LFTB could be inferred to have the exact opposite meaning—that 
LFTB was unsafe for consumption. 
 D.   Judicial Review on the Merits 
1. Agricultural Food Product 
BPI asserted that it was a producer of LFTB, an agricultural 
food product, and that LFTB, like other beef products, would 
perish or decay beyond marketability within a given amount of 
time.124  However, the final step of flash freezing the LFTB125 
may lead the court to find that the product was not in fact 
perishable because it was sold in a frozen state.  Though this 
argument was not raised in the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
the court may decide the issue sua sponte, taking guidance from 
the concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones in Texas 
Beef Group v. Winfrey.  Judge Jones’ opinion interpreted the term 
“beyond marketability” in Texas’ agricultural disparagement 
statute,126 finding that “the purpose of the statute’s definition 
[was] to distinguish perishable from processed food products.”127  
Likewise, LFTB resulted from highly technical processes, was 
 
 121. Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 235. 
 122. Id. ¶ 236. 
 123. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 7. 
 124. Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 676. 
 125. Id. ¶ 59. 
 126. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., 
concurring). 
 127. Id. at 690-91. 
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sold in a final frozen state,128 and could theoretically be stored in 
a frozen state indefinitely.  Thus, the court may find that LFTB 
was not protected by South Dakota’s agricultural disparagement 
statute, because it was too processed to qualify as a perishable 
food product. 
2. Disparagement 
a. “Knows to Be False” 
Plaintiffs alleged that during ABC News’ coverage of LFTB, 
defendants knowingly made false statements about BPI and 
LFTB.129  Additionally, BPI contended that ABC News had access 
to a wide variety of sources that showed the falsity of these 
statements.130  If ABC News did know that its statements were 
false, then this evidence would support the satisfaction of the first 
subpart of the statutory requirement for disparagement. 
However, in its motion to dismiss, ABC News gave three 
defenses to BPI’s allegation that it knew its statements about 
LFTB were false.  First, ABC News argued that the alleged false 
statements were “non-actionable ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ or 
‘imaginative expression.’”131  Next, ABC News argued that the 
alleged false statements were substantially true.132  In support of 
this defense, ABC News directed the court to examine the 
exhibits attached to BPI’s Complaint for evidence that “BPI’s 
claims amount to an inconsequential quibbling over word 
choice.”133  Lastly, ABC News argued that BPI’s objection to ABC 
News’ word choice was non-actionable, because any “subjective 
assessment” suggested through ABC News’ words would not be a 
“provably false statement of fact.”134  In Texas Beef Group v. 
Winfrey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
noted that despite the fact that defendants “melodramatized” the 
 
 128. Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 53, 55-60. 
 129. Id. ¶ 13. 
 130. Id. ¶ 14. 
 131. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 22 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17, 20 (1990)). 
 132. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, 26-35. 
 133. Id. at 28. 
 134. Id. 
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Mad Cow Disease scare, the plaintiffs still failed to carry their 
burden of proving a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
statutory liability.135  Under these rationales, it is probable that 
the court will find that ABC News’ allegedly false statements 
were non-actionable and/or substantially true.  Thus, the first 
subpart of the element of disparagement will not be met. 
b. “Not Safe for Consumption by the Public” 
Plaintiffs contended that between March 7, 2012 and April 3, 
2012, ABC News published multiple statements that implied that 
LFTB was not safe for public consumption.136  In its complaint, 
BPI alleged that the defendants made eight types of statements 
implying that LFTB was not safe for public consumption.137  
 
 135. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 688 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 136. Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 677. 
 137. Id.  These alleged categories are: (1) “Defendants called, described or 
referred to LFTB as ‘pink slime,’” implying that “LFTB was not safe for public 
consumption because it was a noxious, repulsive, and filthy fluid”; (2) 
“Defendants stated that selling ground beef with LFTB was ‘economic fraud’ and 
‘food fraud,’” implying that “selling ground beef with fraud [sic] was ‘fraud’ 
because LFTB was not safe for public consumption”; (3) “Defendants stated that 
LFTB was being produced from ‘waste,’ ‘low-quality’ or ‘low-grade’ trimmings or 
‘scraps,’” implying that “LFTB was not safe for public consumption because it 
was made with inferior and contaminated beef trimmings”; (4) “Defendants 
stated that the beef trimmings used to produce LFTB were ‘once only used in 
dog food and cooking oil,’” implying that “LFTB was not safe for public 
consumption because it was made with inferior and contaminated beef 
trimmings”; (5) “Defendants used derogatory terms to describe LFTB and 
ground beef made with LFTB,” implying that “LFTB was an unsafe product 
being included in ground beef”; (6) “Defendants published false statements 
regarding the process used by BPI to temper beef trimmings when producing 
LFTB,” falsely stating “that LFTB cooked or simmered the beef trimmings,” 
implying that “ground beef with LFTB was not safe for public consumption 
because a cooked product was being added to fresh ground beef” and implying 
that “using LFTB could contaminate fresh ground beef”; (7) “Defendants 
published false statements regarding BPI’s use of ammonium hydroxide . . . 
regarding the method, volume, and purpose of BPI’s ammonium hydroxide 
process,” implying that “the beef trimmings used to produce LFTB were 
contaminated and not safe for public consumption”; and (8) between March 7, 
2012 and April 3, 2012, “Defendants ABC and ABC News  published and 
republished the above statements in segments during World News broadcasts 
where each segment was defamatory in and of itself because the totality of the 
segment created the false impression that BPI’s product, LFTB, was not safe for 
public consumption,” with the implications being drawn from “the way 
Defendants ABC and ABC News covered, portrayed, and juxtaposed information 
regarding LFTB.” Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 677-85. 
19
  
790 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31 
Plaintiffs asserted that the defendants’ statements were “false by 
implication” because LFTB was safe for public consumption, and 
that these statements and their implications were disparaging to 
BPI and LFTB.138  Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
knew the falsity of these disparaging statements, or “recklessly 
disregarded their falsity,” when they broadcast them.139  
However, all of these implications and inferences that BPI 
identified as disparaging were in direct conflict with what ABC 
News claimed to have directly reported—that LFTB was safe to 
eat.140 
In its motion to dismiss, ABC News focused on safety as the 
determinative factor of whether a statement made was 
disparaging under the statute.  ABC News claimed that it 
repeatedly asserted the safety of LFTB for public consumption, 
and made no contradictory statements.141  For example, the ABC 
News Anchors stated that, “the USDA and food industry experts 
[agreed] that lean, finely textured beef [was] safe and 
wholesome,” “[t]he USDA [was] clear in saying, pink slime [was] 
safe,” and “[t]he USDA [said] BPI’s product [was] safe to eat.”142  
Contrary to BPI’s allegation that ABC News attacked the safety 
of LFTB, ABC News asserted that the statements that BPI found 
objectionable were not regarding the safety of LFTB, but instead 
concerned “its general desirability as a component of ground 
beef.”143  ABC News merely directed the public’s attention to a 
 
 138. Id. ¶ 687. 
 139. Id. ¶ 688. 
 140. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 11. 
 141. Id. (providing the following evidence that ABC News reported the safety 
of LFTB for human consumption: “Compl. Ex. 9 (3/21/12 World News) (‘the 
USDA and food industry experts agree that lean, finely textured beef is safe and 
wholesome’); Compl. Ex. 7 (3/16/12 World News) (‘The government agrees the 
product is safe.’); Compl. Ex. 6 (3/15/12 World News) (‘The USDA is clear in 
saying, pink slime is safe.’); Compl. Ex. 5 (3/13/12 Good Morning America) (Dr. 
Richard Besser, ABC News’ Chief Health and Medical Editor: ‘Bottom line, FDA 
says it’s safe’); Compl. Ex. 3 (3/8/12 World News) (‘the USDA says it’s safe to 
eat’); Compl. Ex. 15 (3/9/12 Online Report) (‘the United States Department of 
Agriculture says it’s safe to eat’); Compl. Ex. 16 (3/14/12 Online Report) (same); 
Compl. Ex. 10 (3/26/12 World News) (‘The USDA says BPI’s product is safe to 
eat’); Compl. Ex. 22 (3/26/12 Online Report) (‘the USDA says it’s safe to eat’); 
Compl. Ex. 11 (3/29/12 World News) (‘the USDA food safety undersecretary . . . 
assured the product is safe to eat’)”). 
 142. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 11 
 143. Id. 
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fact that the public was previously unaware of—that most ground 
beef contained LFTB—and then responded to consumer concerns 
about the labeling of LFTB as an ingredient in ground beef. 
When framed in this manner, BPI’s argument was analogous 
to an argument made by the plaintiffs in Texas Beef Group v. 
Winfrey, which was rejected by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.144  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the manner in which the “Dangerous Food” 
segment was edited made the content of the segment knowingly 
false.145  It noted that when “[s]tripped to its essentials, the 
cattlemen’s complaint [was] that the ‘Dangerous Food’ show did 
not present the Mad Cow issue in the light most favorable to 
United States beef.”146  The court explained that “[s]o long as the 
factual underpinnings remained accurate, as they did here, the 
editing did not give rise to an inference that knowingly false 
information was being disseminated.”147  By adopting this 
reasoning in BPI’s case, the court could find that as long as ABC 
News directly asserted the safety of LFTB, then the defendants 
could not be held liable for any inferences to a contradictory 
interpretation. 
Though not legally binding on the United States District 
Court of South Dakota, the reasoning of the court of appeals in 
Winfrey could be instructive in providing a framework for the 
analysis of allegations of inferred disparagement.  While the 
reasoning in Winfrey concerned the satisfaction of the mens rea 
requirement,148 it could nevertheless be easily applied to the case 
at hand to analyze the statutory requirement that liability be 
based on statements regarding the safety of the product.149  
Similar to the accuracy of the underlying facts in Winfrey,150 ABC 
News here unequivocally stated that LFTB was safe for public 
consumption.151  In both cases, the underlying facts failed to 
satisfy the respective statutory requirements.  Consequently, the 
 
 144. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Winfrey, 201 F.3d at 689. 
 149. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-2. 
 150. Winfrey, 201 F.3d at 688-89. 
 151. See generally Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9. 
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alleged inferences based on these underlying facts could not be 
used to satisfy the second subpart of the statutory requirement of 
disparagement. 
3. Statutory Requirements Not Met 
In conclusion, although BPI suffered severe damage from the 
decline in consumer demand for LFTB, it will likely have great 
difficulty supporting its claim of agricultural disparagement 
against ABC News.  The court may find that LFTB was not a 
perishable food product due to its technical processing and frozen 
state.  Alternatively, the court may find that ABC News did not 
knowingly make false statements about LFTB, because its 
statements were substantially true and/or non-actionable speech 
on an issue of public concern deserving of protection by the First 
Amendment.  Additionally, the court may find that LFTB was not 
disparaged because ABC News did not directly state that it was 
unsafe for public consumption, and in fact attested to LFTB’s 
safety.  Since several of the key elements of South Dakota’s 
agricultural disparagement law were not satisfied, it would be 
unlikely that BPI’s agricultural disparagement claim would 
prevail. 
 E.  Judicial Review for Constitutionality 
Assuming arguendo that BPI did prevail on its agricultural 
disparagement claim, it would be probable that the court would 
find South Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Although no agricultural disparagement statute 
has been reviewed for constitutionality, the court would likely 
analyze the statute using the same tests established for common 
law defamation claims under the First Amendment, and find that 
ABC News’ commentary on food safety deserves free speech 
protection. 
1. The First Amendment 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/4
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abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”152  The 
Fourteenth Amendment applies the First Amendment to the 
states.153  Speech is protected under the rationale of assuring the 
“unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political 
and social changes desired by the people.”154 
2. Defamation 
A common law cause of action for defamation consists of four 
elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement is made 
concerning the plaintiff, (2) the statement is published to an 
unprivileged third party, (3) the fault of the publisher amounts to 
at least negligence, and (4) injury to the plaintiff’s reputation is 
caused by the publication.155  Defamation is divided into two 
subcategories—libel, which applies to written or printed words 
and television broadcasts, and slander, which applies to spoken 
words.156  Plaintiffs have the burden of proving seven elements to 
establish liability for defamation: (1) the defamatory character of 
the communication, (2) publication by the defendant, (3) 
application to the plaintiff, (4) the recipient’s perception of its 
defamatory meaning, (5) the recipient’s perception of its intended 
application to the plaintiff, (6) special harm to the plaintiff 
resulting from its publication, and (7) the defendant’s liable mens 
rea regarding the truth or falsity and the defamatory nature of 
the communication.157  A defendant could be liable for defamation 
of a for-profit corporation if the statement prejudices the 
corporation conducting its business or deters others from dealing 
with it.158  The United States Supreme Court has developed 
significant case law concerning the additional limitations and 
standards for defamation causes of action as required under the 
 
 152. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 153. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936). 
 154. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: ELEMENTS STATED § 558 (1977); see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DEFAMATORY COMMUNICATION DEFINED § 559 
(1977). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIBEL AND SLANDER DISTINGUISHED § 
568 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: RADIO AND TELEVISION § 568A 
(1977). 
 157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: BURDEN OF PROOF § 613 (1977). 
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First Amendment.  Liability for defamation has been considerably 
limited by the protections of free speech provided by the First 
Amendment, as discussed below. 
3. Actual Malice 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never 
reviewed an agricultural disparagement statute, critics agree 
that courts should apply the standards created for constitutional 
review in the 1964 defamation case, New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.159  In that case the plaintiff alleged that an 
advertisement published in the New York Times contained 
statements that imputed police misconduct to him as a supervisor 
of the Montgomery, Alabama police department.160  The Court 
held that the guarantees of the First Amendment required public 
officials who sued for defamation to prove that the alleged 
defamatory statement was made with “‘actual malice’—that is, 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”161  Despite the evidence of factual 
inaccuracies and other procedural failures, the Court found that 
the plaintiff in Sullivan presented only enough evidence to prove 
negligence,162 thus failing to show that the defendant published 
the advertisement with “the recklessness required for a finding of 
actual malice.”163 
The United States Supreme Court expanded the Sullivan 
standard to include “public figures” in the 1967 consolidated case 
of Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts.164  In the first of the two cases 
considered, Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, the defendant published an 
article, which accused the plaintiff of fixing a football game.165  
The plaintiff was a well-known and respected football coach.166  
In the second case, Associated Press v. Walker, the defendant 
distributed a news dispatch that identified the politically 
 
 159. Jones, supra note 5, at 835; Fell, supra note 6, at 1020; see generally N.Y. 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 160. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58. 
 161. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
 162. Id. at 286-87. 
 163. Id. at 288. 
 164. See generally Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 165. Id. at 135. 
 166. Id. at 135-36. 
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prominent plaintiff as having led rioters in a charge against 
federal marshals at a desegregation riot.167 
The Court determined that both plaintiffs “commanded a 
substantial amount of independent public interest at the time of 
the publications,” and thus both qualified as “public figures”168 
with sufficient access to the media to be able to rebut false or 
defamatory statements.169  Therefore, the Court held that a 
“public figure” who is not a public official may recover damages 
for defamation based “on a showing of highly unreasonable 
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible 
publishers.”170  There was sufficient evidence to satisfy the 
Sullivan standard in Butts, where the Court found “serious 
deficiencies in investigatory procedure.”171  But there was 
insufficient evidence to satisfy the Sullivan standard in Walker, 
where there were no departures from accepted publishing 
standards.172  Justice Warren made it explicit in his concurring 
opinion that the Sullivan standard applied to both “public 
figures” and “public officials.”173  Thus, a plaintiff who qualifies 
as a “public figure” is required to prove actual malice to prevail on 
a defamation claim against the media. 
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the application of the Sullivan 
standard of actual malice to a lawsuit for product 
disparagement.174  The plaintiff sued a consumer review 
magazine for product disparagement regarding an unfavorable 
review of the sound quality of the plaintiff’s loudspeakers.175  The 
United States District Court for Massachusetts ruled that the 
plaintiff was a “public figure” and applied Sullivan, which was 
accepted by both the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court, because the 
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plaintiff did not contest the lower court’s analysis.176  The Court 
held that the plaintiff failed to provide clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendants wrote the review at issue with 
actual malice.177  However, the Court did not explicitly hold that 
Sullivan was applicable to product disparagement cases, noting 
that it merely accepted the application of Sullivan for the 
purposes of deciding the case.178  Thus, it is unclear whether the 
court would find that Sullivan governed agricultural 
disparagement cases.179 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the United States Supreme 
Court decided the standard to be used when a private plaintiff 
filed a defamation suit against the media.180  The lawsuit arose 
out of the 1968 shooting of a youth by a police officer in Chicago, 
who was later convicted of second-degree murder.181  The plaintiff 
served as legal counsel for the family of the deceased youth in the 
subsequent civil litigation against the police officer.182  Although 
the plaintiff had little involvement in the criminal prosecution of 
the police officer, the defendant published a magazine article that 
depicted the plaintiff as “an architect of the ‘frame-up.’”183 
The Court distinguished Gertz from Sullivan and Butts under 
the rationale that private individuals were more vulnerable to 
injury than public officials and public figures, and they were also 
more deserving of recovery.184  Thus, the Court held that Sullivan 
did not apply to defamation cases brought by private plaintiffs,185 
and it created a separate standard allowing the States to 
individually define the appropriate standard of liability for a 
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory statements about a 
private individual, with the caveat that the States not impose 
liability without fault.186  However, any such new standard set by 
the States applied only to compensatory damages for actual 
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injury.187  In these instances, to recover for punitive damages, the 
Court held that plaintiffs could not recover without proving the 
defendant’s “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the 
truth”—an actual malice standard.188  The Court determined that 
the plaintiff in Gertz was neither a public official nor a public 
figure, and thus reversed and remanded the case to be retried 
under the new standards for private plaintiffs.189 
Agricultural disparagement laws have been criticized 
because many require the defendant to have a mens rea less 
stringent than the Sullivan standard of actual malice.190  It is 
unclear whether a court would follow Bose and apply the Sullivan 
standard of actual malice or apply the less demanding standard 
created by Gertz for recovery by private plaintiffs. 
Regardless of which standard the court chooses to apply, 
South Dakota’s statute would probably survive judicial scrutiny.  
South Dakota’s statute requires the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant knew that the information was false and that the 
defendant stated or implied that the “agricultural food product 
[was] not safe for consumption by the public.”191  Thus, the 
statute’s standard creates a more stringent burden than that of 
actual malice as required by Sullivan.  Actual malice, as defined 
by the Court in Sullivan, meant “with knowledge that it was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”192  
South Dakota’s statute could only be satisfied by one of the two 
mental states that make up actual malice—knowledge of 
falsehood—and it is therefore a more stringent requirement.  
Thus, South Dakota’s statute would likely withstand 
constitutional judicial scrutiny, because it requires a mens rea 
more stringent than actual malice—the most stringent mens rea 
under First Amendment jurisprudence. 
It is unlikely that the court would apply the less demanding 
standard created in Gertz to South Dakota’s statute, because the 
statute requires the plaintiff to prove a separate mental state to 
hold the defendant liable for punitive damages.  Pursuant to 
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South Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute, a producer 
could collect treble damages from “[a]ny person who disparage[d] 
a perishable agricultural food product with intent to harm the 
producer.”193  In contrast, under Gertz, a private plaintiff could 
recover punitive damages by showing the defendant acted with 
actual malice—either actual knowledge of falsity or recklessness 
about whether it was false.194  Thus, the statute’s standard for 
recovering compensatory damages was more stringent than that 
required for recovering punitive damages under Gertz.  
Accordingly, the court could infer that a heightened mental state 
was required to establish liability for agricultural disparagement, 
thereby justifying the application of the heightened Sullivan 
standard to agricultural disparagement statutes. 
4. Proof of Falsity 
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the United States 
Supreme Court held that where a media outlet published “speech 
of public concern,” private plaintiffs in defamation suits must 
show that the statements at issue were false in order to recover 
damages.195  A series of newspaper articles were published by the 
defendant, which implicated the plaintiff, a stockholder in a 
“Thrifty” stores franchise, in involvement with the Mafia and 
participation in government interference.196  Pennsylvania law 
presumed that defamatory statements were false, thus shifting 
the burden of proving truth to the defendant.197  The Court 
overturned Pennsylvania’s law, finding that it must fall “to a 
constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of 
showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.”198  
The Court’s decision rested on resolving the chilling effect of 
deterred speech due to fear of liability, and described this effect 
as “antithetical to the First Amendment’s protection of true 
speech on matters of public concern.”199 
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This issue was determinative in Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes (I), 
which arguably initiated the creation of agricultural 
disparagement statutes.200  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision granting 
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the 
apple growers failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the falsity of statements made during the broadcast of 
“‘A’ is for Apple.”201  Thus, state legislators crafted their 
agricultural disparagement statutes to implicitly shift to the 
defendant the burden of proving truth.202  One critic argued that 
the statutes “suggest that the speaker must prove the factual 
basis for a statement, rather than the plaintiff proving the falsity 
of it.”203  Agricultural disparagement statutes that shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant are probably unconstitutional 
under Hepps.  But South Dakota’s statute was different from 
these other statutes, because it failed to state, explicitly or 
implicitly, which party had the burden of proof.204  Consequently, 
a court would probably interpret the statute to be constitutional, 
by explicitly putting the burden of proof on the plaintiff. 
5. “Of and Concerning” 
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court made an additional 
holding that in order to sustain a claim of libel, the plaintiff had 
to prove that “the words were published ‘of and concerning’ the 
plaintiff . . . ”205  When it applied this test in Sullivan, the Court 
found that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury 
finding that the advertisement at issue, which did not explicitly 
identify the plaintiff, was made “of and concerning” the 
plaintiff.206 
Critics argue that agricultural disparagement statutes too 
broadly define who could bring suit, thus failing to satisfy the “of 
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and concerning” element required by Sullivan.207  One critic finds 
the definition to be too broad when standing is extended to groups 
other than just “producers,”208 while a second critic finds that 
even the group “producers” is too overly inclusive.209  South 
Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute only gives standing 
to the producers of disparaged agricultural products.210  Though 
it is a narrow definition when compared with other states’ 
statutes, South Dakota’s statute may not be narrow enough to 
withstand constitutional review.  Under the standard set forth in 
Sullivan, the court may determine that the term “producers” is 
too broad to limit liability to published words “of and concerning” 
the plaintiff.  The term “producers” may include any producer of 
an agricultural product, as opposed to a specific producer 
identified by the published statements, thus potentially allowing 
liability for statements made that were generally disparaging of 
an agricultural product, but not “of and concerning” the plaintiff. 
In Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes (II), the Washington State apple 
growers’ class action lawsuit filed against the Natural Resources 
Defense Council and Fenton Communications, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ lawsuit for failure to prove that the “60 Minutes” 
segment about apples sprayed with the carcinogenic pesticide 
Alar was “of and concerning” the plaintiffs specifically.211  The 
court found that the broadcast was “‘of and concerning’ all apples 
whether treated with Alar or not,” and that “every apple grower 
in the country was identified.”212  Thus under this reasoning, the 
court would likely find that South Dakota’s statute was 
unconstitutional because it lacked a sufficiently narrow “of and 
concerning” element as required by the protective limitations of 
the First Amendment. 
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6. South Dakota’s Statute is Unconstitutional 
In sum, despite the constitutionality of most of South 
Dakota’s statute, it would probably fail constitutional review 
under the “of and concerning” requirement.  The statute’s 
required mens rea is more stringent than the actual malice 
standard required by Sullivan.  Furthermore, South Dakota’s 
statute would likely be interpreted to properly place the burden of 
proof on the plaintiff to prove falsity, again satisfying the 
constitutional standard for liability established in Hepps.  
Nevertheless, the statute may allow for standing that is too broad 
to meet the Sullivan requirement that statements be made “of 
and concerning” the plaintiff.  By giving standing to all producers 
of a disparaged agricultural food product, the statute may allow 
for recovery by plaintiffs who are merely general producers, 
rather than expressly identified producers.  Accordingly, if the 
court were to judicially review South Dakota’s agricultural 
disparagement statute for constitutionality, it would likely find 
South Dakota’s statute to be unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, BPI has likely failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to hold ABC News liable for the alleged disparagement 
of LFTB.  BPI will probably be unable to meet several of the 
requirements of South Dakota’s agricultural disparagement 
statute.  First, it is unclear whether LFTB, sold as a frozen final 
product, is sufficiently perishable to qualify under South Dakota’s 
statutory definition of an agricultural food product.  Next, ABC 
News raised convincing defenses that it did not knowingly make 
false statements about LFTB.  Finally, ABC News expressly 
asserted the safety of LFTB for public consumption, so there 
could be no inference to the contrary.  ABC News responded to 
consumer concern regarding the labeling of LFTB as an 
ingredient in ground beef.  The public wanted to know more about 
LFTB, and ABC News rose to the occasion, making a substantial 
contribution to the market place of ideas that was well within the 
protections of the First Amendment.  Therefore, BPI’s lawsuit 
would likely fail on the merits. 
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If the court were to conduct a judicial review of South 
Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute, it would likely find 
that the statute violates the First Amendment’s protected right to 
freedom of speech.  South Dakota’s statute, giving standing to 
producers of disparaged agricultural products, would likely be too 
broad to meet the constitutional requirement that defamatory 
statements be “of and concerning” the plaintiff.  As noted above, 
all agricultural disparagement statutes give standing to the 
producers of disparaged food products.  Therefore, if South 
Dakota’s agricultural disparagement statute is struck down as 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, then all 
agricultural disparagement statutes would also be 
unconstitutional.  Such a precedent striking down an agricultural 
disparagement law on First Amendment grounds would assure 
media outlets that they could continue to provide information to 
consumers about agricultural products and their labeling, or lack 
thereof, without the threat of liability for the disclosure of 
unsavory information.  The safety and contents of the food we eat 
is an issue of public concern, and related commentary deserves 
protection by the First Amendment. 
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